我们需要新全球金融管理局
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即便美国的大规模金融救援行动取得成功，也应当再采取一项意义更为深远后续措施——建立“全球金融管理局”(Global Monetary Authority)来监督当前已变得没有国界的市场。
美国政府承认，这场危机已蔓延至全球。美国财政部长汉克•保尔森(Hank Paulson)已表示，在美国经营的外国银行将有资格获得联邦政府的援助，他还敦促其它国家形成自己的救援方案。各国央行也在同步向市场注入资金。这些都应当是走向更全面国际行动的步骤，其目的不只是要扑灭当前的危机，还要在更长远时间内重建和维持资本市场的运作。
令人遗憾的是，当前的全球机构设置没有能力监管不断发展变化的金融体系。国际货币基金组织(IMF)与这场危机无关；在中国和巴西等其它国家作为主要参与者的世界里，七国集团(G7)缺乏合法性；国际清算银行(BIS)没有运作职能。而美联储周围有太多敌对势力，使其不适合作为全球央行。
这种核心地带的真空对每个人来说都是危险的。随着山姆大叔在当前的救援中背上1万亿美元的新债务，美国对巨额外资流入的依赖——每天约为30亿美元——现在势必会增强。未来几年，如果没有其它市场的强力合作，华尔街和美国政府将无法支撑下去。
此外，金融的国际化程度令人难以置信。全球资产在1980年为12万亿美元，到2007年已增至近200万亿美元，远远高于国内生产总值(GDP)或贸易量的增长。目前，这类资本越来越多地出现在亚洲和海湾地区，而不是美国或欧洲。像美国国际集团(AIG)这样的美国企业，在美国以外出售的信用违约掉期(CDS)和保单比在美国国内还多。瑞银(UBS)有3万名美国雇员，在纽约证券交易所上市，并且拥有普惠公司(Paine Webber)。资本市场将会在这样一种背景下发展：新兴市场经济体的增长速度将达到富国的两倍，并可能在本世纪中叶占据全球GDP的近三分之二。
全球化现在还将引发价值体系的冲突。美国以外的多数政府和投资者从未认同美国的牛仔式资本主义制度。现在，它们有充足理由要求美国对金融机构的管理方式做出一些根本性调整。这可以通过协商对美国金融模式进行有意识的改造，也可以通过外国投资者将资金转至它处来实现。
所有这些考虑都表明，我们最终需要一个新的全球金融管理局。它将为资本市场定下基调：不会本能地通过干预规定反对强有力的公共监督职能，并重新将经济增长和发展的目标设定为资本形成，而不是为了交易而交易。
对于央行持有的某些债务而言，全球金融管理局将是一个再保险公司或贴现机构。它将比IMF更为严厉地审查各国政府的监管活动，监督数量有限的全球法规的实施情况。它将对全球性的风险进行监测，并建立一个有效的预警机制，以承担比BIS更大的警示职能。
它将充当“破产法庭”，应对规模超过一定水平的全球性企业的金融重组。全球最大的金融企业必须在全球金融管理局注册并接受其监督，否则将被列入黑名单。它们包括商业企业和银行，还包括主权财富基金、大型对冲基金和私人股本公司。
全球金融管理局的董事会必须包括各国央行官员，他们不仅来自美国、英国、欧元区和日本，而且还来自中国、沙特阿拉伯和巴西。它的资金将来自每个有能力的国家缴纳的强制性会费，以及全球性金融企业缴纳的保险型保费。这些企业包括上市企业、国有企业和私有企业等。
就美国和国际政治而言，建立全球金融管理局的想法可能有些超前。随着当前危机的发展，这种想法可能会发生改变。
本文作者是美国耶鲁大学管理学院(Yale School of Management)胡安•特里普(Juan Trippe)国际贸易和金融学教授
Even if the US's massive financial rescue operation succeeds, it should be followed by something even more far-reaching – the establishment of a Global Monetary Authority to oversee markets that have become borderless. Washington recognises that the crisis has become global. Hank Paulson, Treasury secretary, has said that foreign banks operating in the US will be eligible for federal assistance and he is urging other nations to fashion their own bail-out programmes. Central banks have also been synchronising injections of funds into markets. These should be steps to a more comprehensive international response designed not just to extinguish the current fires, but to rebuild and maintain the capital markets for the longer term. The current global institutional apparatus is woefully incapable of overseeing the financial system that is evolving. The International Monetary Fund is irrelevant to this crisis, the Group of Seven leading industrial countries lacks legitimacy in a world where China, Brazil and others are big players, and the Bank for International Settlement has no operational role. The US Federal Reserve is too besieged to act as a global central bank. That vacuum at the centre is dangerous for everyone. The US's dependence on massive inflows of foreign capital, roughly $3bn (€2bn, £1.6bn) a day, will surely increase now as Uncle Sam acquires $1,000bn in new obligations from current bail-outs. For years to come, Wall Street and Washington will be unable to manage without strong co-operation from other markets. Beyond that, the international dimensions of finance are mind- boggling. Global assets have increased from $12,000bn in 1980 to nearly $200,000bn in 2007, far outstripping the growth of gross domestic product or the expansion of trade. An increasing amount of this capital now resides in Asia and the Gulf, not the US or Europe. A US company such as AIG sold more of its credit default swaps and insurance policies outside the US than within it. UBS employs 30,000 Americans, is listed on the New York Stock Exchange and owns PaineWebber. The capital markets will evolve in the context in which emerging market economies will be growing twice as fast as the rich nations and will, by mid-century, probably account for almost two-thirds of global GDP. Globalisation will now also create a clash of philosophies. Most governments and investors outside the US never shared the American system of cowboy capitalism. Now they have good reason to demand that some fundamental changes be made in the way the US manages its financial institutions. This can happen with a conscious, negotiated modification in the US financial model, or it could result from foreign investors shifting their funds elsewhere. All of these considerations point to the eventual need for a new Global Monetary Authority. It would set the tone for capital markets in a way that would not be viscerally opposed to a strong public oversight function with rules for intervention, and would return to capital formation the goal of economic growth and development rather than trading for its own sake. A GMA would be a reinsurer or discounter for certain obligations held by central banks. It would scrutinise the regulatory activities of national authorities with more teeth than the IMF has and oversee the implementation of a limited number of global regulations. It would monitor global risks and establish an effective early warning system with more clout to sound alarms than the BIS has. It would act as “bankruptcy court” for financial reorganisations of global companies above a certain size. The biggest global financial companies would have to register with the GMA and be subject to its monitoring, or be blacklisted. That includes commercial companies and banks, but also sovereign wealth funds, gigantic hedge funds and private equity firms. The GMA's board would have to include central bankers not just from the US, UK, the eurozone and Japan, but also China, Saudi Arabia and Brazil. It would be financed by mandatory contributions from every capable country and from insurance-type premiums from global financial companies – publicly listed, government owned, and privately held alike. In terms of US and international politics, a Global Monetary Authority is probably an idea whose time has not yet come. That may change as today's crisis evolves. The writer is the Juan Trippe professor of international trade and finance at the Yale School of Management
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